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1. Introduction 
The conventional wisdom among labour economists is that trade union membership pays off. In the 
academic literature on the subject, there is talk of ‘the wage gap between union members and non-
members’ (Hirsch 2004a, 2004b). The positive wage gap is accounted for by how the primary objective of 
the trade union movement – negotiating and entering into individual agreements or collective bargaining 
agreements (CBAs) with employers – provides their members with a comparative wage premium in relation 
to non-members in the unorganized labour market. Without a CBA, employees are left to the market 
forces, which will depress wages and result in increased wage dispersion. 
The documentation of the existence and extent of the wage gap can be found in innumerable empirical 
studies, all of which build on data documenting the differences in wage levels for union members and non-
members, adjusted for a variety of other factors. This method is neither useful nor relevant in the Danish 
context, however, as Danish labour market statistics lack valid data for trade union membership and the 
advantages of CBA-coverage are enjoyed by union members and non-members alike. Danish CBAs are ‘area 
agreements’, meaning that they cover the non-members as well as the union members, all of whom are 
remunerated according to the CBA. This brings us to the so-called ‘free rider problem’, which holds a 
significant place in the trade union literature (Ibsen, Høgedahl and Scheuer 2012; Olson 1965; Visser 2006). 
It is therefore relevant to investigate whether a wage gap exists in the Danish context – positively or 
negatively – between wage earners who are covered by a CBA and those who are not. What is the impact 
of CBA coverage on wage levels and wage dispersion for occupations in the private sector compared to the 
wage formation that can be observed among the wage earners who are not covered by a CBA? 
We use ‘Propensity Score Matching’ (Heckman et al. 1999), a method that accounts for a number of 
method-related problems and presents the most relevant method in relation to casting light on the 
existence of the wage gap and its size in the Danish labour market. 
The relationship between CBA coverage and wages largely depends on national institutional arrangements. 
The results achieved with Danish data will therefore generally only be partially comparable with most of 
the findings in the existing literature, which for the most part draw on American or British data (Booth and 
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Bryan 2004; Bryson 2002; Budd and Na 2000; Eren 2007). The focus in this article is therefore on specific 
Danish conditions. The article opens with an overview of how higher wages can theoretically be justified for 
CBA-covered employees measured in relation to the parts of the labour market in which wage formation is 
dominated by the market forces alone. Neo-classical theory and the more institutionally oriented theories 
present their respective accounts of the impact of trade unions on wage levels and structures. The section 
is rounded off with placement of the theoretical discussion in the Danish context with the Danish labour 
market model as the frame of reference. The following section discusses the methodological reflections 
upon which the article is based with respect to the empirical identification of whether or not CBAs actually 
influence wage levels and pay structures. The choice of the PSM method is justified and discussed. The data 
set is then presented, which provides the basis for the analysis, followed by an overview of the results. The 
article concludes with a discussion of the results of the analysis, where the primary emphasis is on 
explaining the differences in the impact of CBAs on the wage levels and structures across occupational 
groups. 
2. Trade unions, CBAs and wage formation 
It is fair to regard trade unions as regulatory institutions that influence the market forces, thereby exerting 
an impact on remuneration, employment levels, productivity and so forth (Ibsen and Stamhus 2016). Trade 
unions work to sell labour collectively, thereby improving the wages and working conditions of their 
members in relation to the wages and working condition that would be obtained by selling one’s labour on 
one’s own. In traditional, neo-classical economic theory, the primary explanation for trade union 
membership is limited to wage earners simply maximizing their utility (i.e., improved wages and working 
conditions); that is, a purely utilitarian objective. At best, the trade union can offer a better ‘package deal’ 
in relation to wages and working conditions than workers will otherwise be able to obtain on the free 
market. Labour market sociology and political science provide further explanatory variables: social status, a 
sense of solidarity and political influence (Booth 1985; Ibsen 2014; Visser 2002). 
2.1. Trade unions and wage formation from the perspective of economic theory 
A number of economic framework conditions exist for the opportunities available to trade unions and the 
demands they can make. These conditions can be very different, depending on whether the union is acting 
in relation to employers in the private or public sectors. Neo-classic economic theory begins with the notion 
that trade unions and strikes only occur in the private sector if insufficient competition (e.g., monopolies) 
mean that companies earn supernormal profits. On that background, the raison d´être of trade unions and 
their rationale is to bring about an institutional framework for bargaining and the struggle over the 
distribution of the supernormal profit. Conversely, if there is talk of anything close to a market with perfect 
competition characterized by many small companies and where new enterprises can be established – and 
closed freely – the supernormal profits will tend to be out-competed, which eliminates the basis for the 
trade union activities. 
If imperfect competition is a short-term phenomenon, there will be a tendency for the trade unions to 
disappear; but as the Danish trade union movement has existed since 1872 (Ibsen and Jørgensen 1979), the 
strict economic logic must be modified so as to include permanent market imperfections. If this is the case, 
this might explain the presence of trade unions in terms of balancing the market power of companies and 
optimizing their members’ wages, employment levels and working conditions. Kaufman (2008) points out 
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transaction costs as one of the primary explanations for why ”labor markets are inherently and always and 
everywhere imperfectly competitive” (Kaufman 2008). He claims that the functioning of the labour market 
is permanently marked by limited rationality, imperfect information and imperfectly defined property 
rights in relation to the use of labour. This means that the employer–employee relationship is not perfectly 
regulated, which emphasizes the sustained relevance of trade unions as a regulatory institution. 
Neo-classical economic theory has identified two main types of models attempting to explain trade union 
influence on wages and employment: the ‘monopoly union’ model and the ‘efficient bargaining’ model. The 
construction of these two models and their results are briefly presented in the following, followed by a 
more institutionally oriented theory. 
The so-called monopoly union model sees the objective of trade unions as being to maximize the union 
members’ utility. This can be reduced to a matter of increasing their wages and improving employment 
figures. The utility maximization of the unions is limited by the behaviour and restrictions of companies. If 
companies are in a market with perfect competition, where the companies are unable to influence the 
market price for the products, the trade union is faced with a negatively sloping demand curve. This places 
limits on the union’s demands. 
The monopoly union model assumes that the trade union will monopolize the supply of labour. The union 
thus sells labour to small and mid-sized companies within a given region and is able to set wages. The 
company then decides how much labour it is able to employ given the demand curve. In this case, the trade 
union members who enter into a CBA with many small companies will be rewarded with higher wages in 
exchange for their union dues. In this model, high union wage demands come at the cost of employment. 
This applies even if, when establishing their wage demands, the union reflects on the employment-related 
effects. Trade unions can have varying preferences for the trade-off between wages and employment 
levels, and the bargaining strategy is determined by the union members and leaders. 
The monopoly union model is only relevant in the cases in which an individual union is dealing with a 
number of small, unorganized businesses. This is rarely the case. Normally, companies will attempt to 
influence the wage formation through negotiations, either independently or through an employers’ 
association. In the Danish context, opposing monopolies exist on the sector and national levels, the result 
being nation-wide agreements. 
The result of negotiations between two organized parties can be analysed using the efficient bargaining 
model. Before presenting this model, however, it is useful to make a number of comments about the 
framework surrounding the bargaining game. In the cases where an individual trade union or a joint 
negotiating body of unions is faced with a single company or a group of companies in an employers’ 
association, we have a bargaining game between opposing monopolies. This is the case for the central 
bargaining in the Danish private sector. In the case of opposing monopolies, wages, product prices, 
production and employment will not be determined by market forces but rather by the relative bargaining 
power of the parties and the bargaining game. 
The relative bargaining power is determined by the ability of the parties – either via arguments or threats 
regarding strikes and/or lockouts – to convince their counterpart that it would best pay to agree to the 
proposed wages/demands (cf. the Hicks model; Ibsen and Stamhus 2016). The conditions for competition, 
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the unemployment situation and the ideological climate also affect the relative bargaining power. In the 
bargaining, both parties’ approaches will be determined by what they each regard as the cost of accepting 
their counterpart’s wage offer/demand weighed up against the costs associated with rejecting it. There is 
talk of anticipated costs, as they cannot be determined beforehand with any certainty. 
The basis for the efficient bargaining model is that there are combinations of wages and employment 
available to the companies that will provide the same profits, as illustrated by their isoprofit curves. 
Similarly, the trade unions will choose optimal combinations of wages and employment, as illustrated by 
their indifference curves. The points where the unions’ indifference curves meet the companies’ isoprofit 
curves reveal the efficient negotiated solutions for both parties. This is referred to as the contract curve. 
The bargaining model means that the trade unions are able to obtain higher wages and a better 
employment situation for their members via CBAs. The union negotiates higher wages, but this requires 
that the companies are in a product market in which supernormal profits can be earned. 
2.2. Trade unions and wage formation in an institutional perspective  
The institutionally oriented labour market theories add to the significance of the bargaining models for the 
extent of the wage increases and therefore also employment and the inflation rate (Stamhus 2001). The 
corporatist angle, for example, claims that institutions can exist, including trade unions, which coordinate 
wage formation and include factors other than the members’ wage increases. Centralized wage bargaining, 
in which the central organizations coordinate and regulate the wage bargaining in the individual sectors, 
can prevent the individual sectors from sub-optimizing and for example ‘stealing’ qualified labour from 
other companies via bonuses, resulting in inflation and lost competitiveness. In this way, it is possible in a 
centralized bargaining structure to prevent such ‘externalities’ by coordinating the wage formation. This is 
possible in a centralized bargaining structure with the employers but can also be practiced in tripartite 
negotiations in which the government finances wage moderation by improving the social benefits 
(pensions, unemployment insurance, education etc.). Wage moderation can lead to lower inflation, 
improved competitiveness and employment and can therefore be an advantage for most of the union’s 
members. But it can also lead to a compressed wage structure, as a higher employment rate favours those 
with the lowest wages and least educated, while the best educated pay the price in the form of lower wage 
increases. In bargaining models like this with strong, centralized negotiations and corporatist features, the 
wage premium to which both the monopoly union model and the efficient bargaining model refer can be 
reduced or entirely eliminated combined with a compressed waged structure. 
The theoretical models – neo-classical and institutional models alike – do not provide any clear answer as 
to whether a positive wage gap exists in the trade unions’ favour. The monopoly union model provides the 
employees who are covered by it with a monopolistic benefit in the form of a wage premium, but this 
requires perfect competition and operates on either the corporate or regional level. The efficient 
bargaining model requires imperfect competition on both the goods and labour markets, and the 
bargaining between the social partners will be determined by the relative balance of power between the 
parties. The institutionally oriented theories are primarily bargaining models that point to the bargaining 
level, the parties’ preferences and relative strength as decisive for the effects of wage formation but also 
point to a compressed wage structure as a result of the trade union influence on wage formation.  
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2.3. Trade unions, CBAs and wage formation in the Danish context 
In Denmark, the basis for the discussion of the impact of the trade unions on wage formation is ‘the Danish 
model’, with its institutional set-up and built-in organization and bargaining structure. In both the private 
and public sectors, both parties are well organized and have high organisation rates and wealthy main and 
sub-organizations (Ibsen 2014; Ibsen and Stamhus 2016). In the private sector, the main negotiators are the 
leading industrial organizations, the Confederation of Danish Industry (DI) and CO-Industri (CO-I), which 
represents a bargaining cartel consisting of unions of varying sizes. CBAs are reached for all of the 
companies that are members of the DI-affiliated employers’ associations, and the agreements regulate the 
wages for all of the employees who are working for these companies. The CBAs are divided in terms of 
agreements that cover both skilled and unskilled workers and white-collar agreements that cover office 
workers, technicians and professionals. The managers and high-level white-collar workers are covered by 
the DI and CO-I agreements. These are ‘area agreements’ whereby the CBAs cover union members and 
non-members alike. In other words, the agreements also apply to the non-organized employees (free 
riders). 
The CO-I bargaining cartel has a tradition for including consideration to corporate competitiveness and 
unemployment rates in their bargaining targets and negotiation preferences. This bargaining strategy will, 
ceteris paribus, possibly lead to a kind of wage moderation and compressed wage structure in which 
consideration for the employment of those with limited education and training will be a high priority. 
The agreements reached between DI and CO-I are subsequently copied – as far as wage increases are 
concerned – to all of the other organizations and employees in the other sectors in the private sector, in 
construction, and the entire private service sector. While there is basically talk of decentralized bargaining, 
in reality we are talking about a highly centralized course of negotiations. In the unorganized labour 
market, where companies have chosen to opt out of an employers’ association but where their employees 
are predominantly union members, ‘supplementary agreements’ are quite common. The local union 
requests that the companies enter into an agreement, the content of which corresponds to the agreement 
between DI and CO-I, and in many cases the unorganized companies accept an agreement corresponding to 
that which was reached in the organized labour market. The employees in the labour market with 
‘supplementary agreements’ therefore work for the same wages and under the same working conditions as 
in the companies that are members of an employers’ association. 
In the unorganized labour market with supplementary agreements, some 60% of the employees are 
covered by CBAs (as opposed to 90% in the organized labour market, cf. section 4 below). In the remainder 
of the labour market, where the companies are not members of an employers’ association and have not 
entered into a supplementary agreement, wage formation is in principle determined by the market forces. 
In as much as there are generally high levels of organization in the Danish labour market, however (both on 
the employee and employer sides of the equation – and therefore high CBA coverage), many of the 
unorganized companies are forced in practice to copy the prevailing agreements if they are to be able to 
recruit and maintain the labour they require.  
Our preliminary hypothesis will therefore be that – depending on the market conditions – there will be little 
difference between the wage levels in the parts of the Danish labour market that are covered by CBAs and 
the parts that are not. But it is also assumed that it is possible to find differences in the individual 
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occupations’ wage levels in the parts of the labour market that are covered by CBAs and those that are not. 
Particularly in the market for low-skilled labour, CBA-covered employees can obtain higher wages in 
relation to the segments of the labour market in which wage levels and the wage structure for low-skilled 
labour are solely determined by the market forces. 
3. Wage premium and CBA coverage – what to measure?  
3.1. Methodological considerations 
As mentioned in the introduction, the international literature on the relationship between trade unions, 
wage levels and pay structure concentrates on the extent of ‘the union membership wage premium’ 
(Bryson 2002; Hirsch 2004). These studies measure the effect of union membership on wage levels and 
wage distribution. Other studies distinguish between the union members who are covered by a CBA, non-
members with CBA coverage and non-members without CBA coverage. Here, there are three employee 
groups, where non-members who are covered by a CBA (free riders) and non-members without a CBA are 
included in the control group to which the CBA-covered union members are compared. In these studies, 
the CBA-covered union members enjoy considerably higher wages than do CBA-covered non-members 
(Budd and Na 2000; Schumacher 1999). Especially in sectors with few free riders, the difference is strongly 
in the favour of the members. 
Reviews of the literature in the field does not point to studies that solely focus on the differences in wage 
levels for employees who are covered by a CBA (union members or not) and those who are not (Hirsch 
2004). As this study is unable to identify the union-membership status of the employees, we are left to 
measure the impact of the unions on wage formation by focusing on the impact of CBAs on wage 
formation: the difference in wage levels and wage differentiation for employees who are covered by a CBA 
and those who are not. As emphasized in section 2, this approach is relevant in the Danish context with 
respect to how the Danish organization and bargaining model is structured. 
The explanation for a positive wage gap in favour of those covered by a CBA (cf. section 2) is possibly that 
the unions in the areas in which supernormal profits are earned are able to exploit their relative bargaining 
power to achieve wage levels that exceed the levels in the parts of the labour market that are not covered 
by agreements. The wage gap can be stable and sustainable in relation to the segments of the economy 
that are exposed to greater competition. In other words, it is a segmented economy and a dual labour 
market (Leontaridi 1998). In the sectors where supernormal profits can be made, companies without CBAs 
are able to attempt to match the wage levels in the sectors with agreements in order to recruit and retain 
labour. This eliminates or reduces the unions’ positive wage gap. 
Methodological problems can also arise if we solely consider the difference between the employee areas 
that are covered by CBAs and those that are not. There might possibly be differences between the 
employees who are covered by an agreement and those who are not; a bias that can increase the positive 
wage gap in favour of those with an agreement. If the workers seeking jobs at the CBA-covered companies 
are predominantly characterized by limited productivity and therefore achieve the greatest benefits from 
being in the agreement-covered companies, this selection mechanism will underestimate the effect of the 
CBA on the wage gap. The reverse selection problem is also conceivable: if there is a queue in front of the 
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agreement-covered companies offering ‘wage premiums’, these companies will choose the most 
productive employees in the queue, which will lead to the overestimation of the (positive) wage gap. 
3.2. Propensity score matching  
In order to account for this selection bias, we apply a statistical matching method, propensity score 
matching (PSM), (Heckman et al. 1999), which takes the selection bias into account by preprocessing the 
data prior to the analysis such that the wages for employees with and without a CBA can be compared. In 
other words, we attempt to isolate the impact of CBA coverage on wage levels and wage distribution from 
the effect of the employees’ personal characteristics, workplace characteristics and characteristics of the 
specific employment relation between the employer and the employee. In our data (cf. section 4), CBA 
coverage is measured at the workplace level. When referring to the effect of agreement coverage, we are 
then talking about the effect of being employed at a workplace where most of the employment relations 
are covered by a CBA. 
CBA coverage can be regarded as a ‘treatment’ – and we are interested in the effect of this treatment. If it 
were random which employment relations are covered by CBAs, then we would merely be able to compare 
the wages for those employment relations that are covered by an agreement and those that are not. CBA 
coverage is not random, however, and it is not possible in practice to carry out a randomized, controlled 
experiment. But CBA coverage is not an individual choice in Denmark. Whether an employment relation is 
covered by a CBA or not depends on a number of observable factors for the employment relation, the 
workplace and the employee. The primary factors are the industry of the workplace in question, the kind of 
job and the employee’s gender and education. In as much as these factors are observable and as we have 
access to a large amount of register data, it is possible to arrive at an estimate for the impact of the 
agreement coverage by preprocessing the data with propensity score matching prior to the estimation of 
the effect (see Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008; Imbens and Wooldridge 2009, section 5; Stuart 2010). 
CBA coverage is measured at the workplace level, whereas wages are measured using data for the 
employee at the employment-relationship level. The question then becomes what pay a given employee at 
an agreement-covered workplace would have received if their workplace was not covered by a CBA. As 92% 
of the employment relations in our data stem from agreement-covered workplaces, however, it is more 
reasonable to estimate the effect of lacking CBA coverage on the remaining 8% without CBA coverage. For 
this 8%, it is possible to find a corresponding number of similar employment relations among the 92% of 
those who are covered by an agreement, meaning that the counterfactual wage can be calculated.    
therefore indicates whether employee   is employed in a workplace without CBA coverage. If     , then 
 ’s workplace is not covered. In other words, we are forced to apply a slightly convoluted definition for the 
8% in the data set who are ‘treated’ with ‘no agreement coverage’. 
In order to identify the corresponding 8% among the agreement-covered observations, propensity score 
matching is used. This means that every employment relationship without CBA coverage is matched with 
an agreement-covered employment relationship with the same propensity score. The propensity score for 
an observation represents a measurement of the probability that the employment relationship in question 
is not covered by a CBA:  (    ). 
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Let  (  ) be the wage for employee  .  ( ) is then the wage for employee   if he/she works at a 
workplace without CBA coverage, and  ( ) is the wage if the workplace is covered. We are interested in 
the value   : the effect on wages of working at a workplace without CBA coverage. 
      ( )    ( ) (1) 
It is possible to observe either  ( ) or  ( ) – but not both for a given employee,  . That which cannot be 
observed is the counterfactual outcome, which must therefore be estimated. Estimating the individual 
effect of CBA coverage,   , requires strict assumptions, for which reason it is generally not estimated.
1
 
Instead, the expected population values for   are estimated. This study focuses on the value  ( |   )  
     : the expected effect of not being covered by a CBA for those without agreement coverage; or rather, 
‘the average treatment effect on the treated’. We expect       to be negative and therefore refer to the 
effect as a pay loss.       is the difference between the expected wages in the group without CBA 
coverage versus the expected wages for the same group if they had such coverage. 
        [ ( )|   ]   [ ( )|   ] (2) 
 [ ( )|   ] can easily be calculated from the data, whereas  [ ( )|   ] must be estimated. 
Estimating  [ ( )|   ] and thereby identifying the causal effect       requires the assumption that 
the outcome ( ) does not depend on   after controlling for the vector of control variables,  . In other 
words, we assume that ( )   | : independence between CBA coverage and wages among those with 
agreement coverage conditional on the factors in  . The effects in   must therefore not depend on  . In 
other words, the control variables in   cannot be affected by the CBA coverage. This means that we must 
include all of the effects in   that have an impact on both wages and the probability for agreement 
coverage. This study draws on highly detailed register data which allow us to assume that this is possible.2 
Estimating  [ ( )|   ] also requires that  (    | )   . In other words, the conditioned probability 
for all employees that they do not have CBA coverage must be < 1; or: there are no employees for whom it 
is impossible to have agreement coverage. This means, first and foremost, that we assume that there are 
no industries or occupations where CBA coverage is impossible.3  
                                                          
1 Collectively referred to as ‘the stable unit treatment assumption’, involving, among other things, that  (  ) only 
depends on    and not on     . In our case, this means that the wages for employee   do not depend on other 
employees having CBA coverage. As a CBA is by definition collective, this assumption cannot be justified in this study. 
See Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) and the references therein for further details. 
2 The assumption ( )   |  can be rendered further plausible by using a difference-in-difference (DiD) estimator, 
as one thereby implicitly includes unobservable individual effects in  . This is precisely possible with register data; 
that is, to estimate the change in wages in relation to a change in CBA status. But there are few instances of 
employment relations that shift from or to CBA coverage. Instead, a DiD estimator will be based on the employees 
who change jobs between workplaces with different CBA status. Changing jobs in itself is a ‘treatment’ that affects 
wages, and it will be difficult to separate the effects. Moreover, it is unclear for whom the estimated effects will be 
representative. 
3 However, we do not need to assume the opposite: there may well be industries where CBA coverage is the only 
option. 
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3.3. Estimation of the propensity score model 
The propensity score model is a traditional regression model for binary dependent variables. The 
dependent variable is the logit transformation of the probability for the employee’s workplace not being 
covered by a CBA:  (    )    . 
All of the available variables affecting both the probability for agreement coverage and the wages in the 
employment relationship are used as explanatory variables. This is the vector  . As already mentioned 
above, it is necessary for the explanatory variables to be strongly exogenous; that is, affected neither by    
nor expectations of   . The model is presented below and the variables are described in detail in section 5. 
The model is shown in summary form, and it is implicit that the betas for the categorical variables 
Occupation, Education and Industry refer to more than a single population parameter. 
      (  )                                                             
                     (3) 
For            distinction is drawn between five occupations and the reference is ‘Clerks, Service, Sales’. 
Managers, professionals and technicians are expected to have higher probability for non-CBA coverage; 
that is,     . Crafts and Operator, Transport, Manual are expected to have lower probability for     . 
            is the natural logarithm for the employee’s seniority in the current employment relation. 
Longer seniority is expected to give lower probability for     .      is 1 for men, and men are expected 
to have lower probability for     . For           , distinction is drawn between five levels of education 
and the reference is 1-2 years tertiary education. It is expected that the probability for      is higher the 
longer the education.      is 1 if the workplace is located in Copenhagen. The probability of      is 
expected to be higher in Copenhagen.       is the natural  logarithm for the number of employees in the 
workplace. The probability of      is expected to be lower for larger workplaces. For          , 
distinction is drawn between 26 industries in which CBA coverage and wage levels are expected to vary. 
The reference industry is ‘Computer programming and consulting services’. 
We will estimate the effect of CBA coverage for the private labour market overall – but also for each of five 
different occupations. In other words, we will establish six different propensity score models. Equation 3 is 
the model for the entire data set. The other five models will naturally not include            but will also 
differ on other points. It is important to match on a propensity score that is calculated from the correct 
model, and there is no reason to believe that the correct model is the same for all occupations. In other 
words, there is no reason to believe that the same factors determine the probability for CBA coverage for 
managers as for professionals and technicians etc. 
Moreover, the number of observations varies dramatically among the respective occupations. For some 
occupations, the highly detailed division in industries used for the overall data therefore cannot be used. In 
order to find the best model for each occupation, numerous logistic regressions have been compared on 
the basis of the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), the ability of the model to predict CBA coverage and the 
balance between the treatment and control groups resulting from the estimated propensity score. The 
many different models differ from one another with respect to the division of the industry variable, the 
division of the education variable and how Ln(size) and Ln(experience) are included. Attempt is made with 
the squared terms and different interactions with the categorical variables. The chosen models will be seen 
in connection with the presentation of the results. 
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3.4. The matching procedure 
The linear-fitted value, the logit-value from the regression, is used to match the observations, as this can 
reduce the bias in the estimated effects of the treatment in relation to using the actual estimated 
probability (Stuart 2010). 
Matching is carried out according to the closest-neighbour method, meaning that each observation without 
CBA coverage is matched to the observation with CBA coverage with the least difference in propensity 
score. Before matching, observations are removed from the group of employment relations with and 
without a CBA where the logit value is outside of the distribution of logit values for the opposing group. In 
this manner, a number of observations from the raw data are excluded from use in the matched group of 
employment relations with agreement coverage, while all of the observations in the group of employment 
relations without CBA coverage are used in the analysis in the overall data. There are therefore no 
differences in the group of employment relations without CBA coverage before and after matching. In the 
occupation-specific analyses, up to four observations from the treatment group are omitted, as presented 
in Table 5 in section 6. Within the occupation ‘managers’, for example, four employment relations are 
omitted. These four employment relations without CBA coverage within management have such low 
probability for agreement coverage that it is not possible to find corresponding employment relations 
among those with CBA coverage. We match in a 1:1 ratio without replacement, such that the final groups 
of employment relations with and without CBA coverage are of equal number and consist of equal numbers 
of unique individuals. This simplifies the analysis in section 6, as we can treat the two groups as two 
samples. 
The graphic inspection of the distributions of the propensity score in the three groups (employment 
without CBA coverage, all observations with CBA coverage and the matched group with CBA coverage) 
shows that the vast majority of the observations in all groups have an estimated propensity score < 0, 
meaning that the model for the vast majority of employment relations predicts that there will be CBA 
coverage. However, the model clearly attributes greater probability for being without CBA coverage to 
those who actually are without it. There are 75,147 employment relations in the group without CBA 
coverage, and matching must make sure that out of the 836,007 employment relations with CBA coverage 
in the data, we are able to select a control group, which has the same distribution for propensity score as 
the treatment group but which is nevertheless actually covered by a CBA.
4
 
In order to assess whether the result of the matching is satisfactory, we consider the standardized bias 
after matching for each of the variables. The standardized bias is a measure of the difference in mean value 
between the treatment group and the control group relative to the spread. For the variable  , the 
standardized bias   ( ) is calculated as: 
   ( )  
  ( )   ( )
√
  ( )   ( )
 
*100 (4) 
In equation 4,  ( ) is the average and  ( ) is the sample variance. A subscript t refers to the treatment 
group (i.e., the group without CBA coverage), while a subscript c refers to the control group (i.e., the group 
                                                          
4
 The graphic analysis of the distribution of the propensity score is not reported in the paper but is available from the 
authors. 
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with CBA coverage that is matched to the treatment group). Following Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008), we 
divide by the average standard deviation in the two groups but we can also use the standard deviation in 
the treatment group alone (Stuart 2010) or refrain from dividing the numerator by 2 (Imbens and 
Wooldridge 2009). Rules of thumb are ordinarily applied, such as the absolute standardized bias having to 
be less than 3 less than or 5 in order for the data to be balanced (Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008). It is also 
possible to argue, however, that as long as the absolute standardized bias is less than 25, the remaining 
bias can be eliminated by using a regression to calculate the effect of being without CBA coverage instead 
of merely comparing the average result for the two groups (Stuart 2010).5 In our analysis, we have multiple 
cases of absolute standardized bias greater than 5 so we also reporte a regression-adjusted estimate for 
the effect of the treatment. 
How all of the variables in the propensity score model are distributed after matching is described with the 
standardized bias and with the variance ratio     ⁄  in Table 7 in the Appendix. There are a few cases of 
standardized bias over 5 and two cases in which the value exceeds 10 (10.3 and 11.4, respectively). The 
variance ratio is never under 0.5 nor over 2. 
The logistic regressions for the calculation of the propensity score in the occupation-specific analyses are 
not reported, but the structure of the models is implicit in Table 7, as the distribution after matching is 
presented for all and only the variables used to calculate the propensity score. 
Data sets combined from the relevant treatment and control groups will be used in the following to assess 
the effect of CBA coverage on wages. In these data sets, it is practically random who has agreement 
coverage. 
4. Data 
Before we account for the data set that we are going to analyse, a summary overview will be provided of 
how many employees are covered by a CBA in the private and public sectors and in the economy as a whole 
for the period 1997–2011. 
4.1. CBA coverage in the Danish private sector 
Viewed over a longer period of time, the collective agreement coverage on the Danish labour market is on 
the same level in 2012 as it was in 1997: roughly 84% (cf. Table 1). The collective agreement coverage in the 
private sector is a total of 74%, which reflects the high coverage in some areas, approaching 90%, and much 
lower coverage in the unorganized labour market, approximately 60%. In the unorganized labour market, 
the trade union movement signs a so-called accession agreement with each company that is outside of the 
employer community. 
  
                                                          
5
 In addition to |  |    , it is also required that         ⁄    (Stuart, 2010). 
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Table 1.  Development in collective agreement coverage (%), 1997–2012  
 1997 2002 2012 
DA 89 91 88 
FA 96 93 89 
SALA 95 95 - 
Other/unorganized 57 53 59 
Private sector – total 75 73 74 
Public sector 100 100 100 
Entire labour market 84 83 84 
Note: The figures for 2012 do not include SALA, Sammenslutningen af Landbrugets Arbejdsgiverforeninger, 
which has been admitted to DA as of 1 July 2010. 
Source: The Confederation of Danish Employers (DA), The labour market reports from 1998, 2003 and 
2013. 
 
In the analysed period, CBA coverage in the unorganized labour market has remained relatively stable at 
around 60%, which indicates that the trade union movement apparently has the same ability and 
willingness to sign accession agreements with the companies on this market as on the organized labour 
market. 
CBA coverage varies dramatically from sector to sector; from 74% in the private sector to 100% in the 
public sector. Within the private sector, agreement coverage is highest in the manufacturing and 
construction sectors and lowest in the service sector (Ibsen, Høgedahl and Scheuer 2012). 
4.2. The data set – composition and content 
The data material in this paper is based on a registry data from Statistics Denmark and the sample ‘Other 
operating expenses’ (OOE), which are combined with the business information from the Danish Employers’ 
Association and the Financial Sector Employers’ Association (FA). The data set covers the period 2002–
2011, but this paper only analyses data from 2011. The structural statistics on earnings
6
 is a set of annual 
statistics containing information about wage levels and the wage composition for the entire labour market. 
We use the information from the private sector, and it is from these statistics that we have acquired the 
information about hourly wages. OOE is a sample-based statistic containing information about private 
employers’ expenses in connection with employment relations. It is from these statistics that the 
information pertaining to CBA coverage (or lack thereof) has been acquired, and “agreement coverage” 
means that the reporting officer has indicated that most of the company employees are covered by a CBA. 
Because there is a tendency for companies to not always report whether or not they are covered by CBAs, 
supplementary information has been obtained from DA and FA. If it can be established that the company is 
a member of DA or FA, it is assumed that the company is covered by a CBA. 
The data therefore covers more or less the entire private sector, with the exception of agriculture and 
fisheries, but only has information about companies with at least 10 full-time employees. In addition, the 
more atypical employment relations have been removed so that the employees for whom we have 
information have an employment relation with at least 8 weekly hours of work and at least 1 month of 
employment. 
                                                          
6
 Lønstrukturstatistikken. 
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Since CBA coverage is partially self-reported and the data do not include workplaces with fewer than 10 
employees, there is a risk that the data are not representative for the Danish private sector labour market. 
Small businesses are less inclined to have CBA coverage, and businesses without agreement coverage are 
less inclined to report to OOE, so one must expect that employment relations without agreement coverage 
are underrepresented in the data set. This is only a problem if there is a systematic link between the effect 
of CBA coverage on wages and the probability of a missing observation. There is no immediate reason to 
expect such a relationship. 
The central unit in the data material is ‘employment relation’, which is defined as employment with a 
particular employer at a particular workplace with a particular occupation. When the employer, workplace 
or occupation changes, there is talk of a new employment relation. The number of employment relations is 
therefore greater than the number of unique employees in the data. 
4.3. Observations and variables 
The data set contains 911,154 employment relations, which can be described using a number of variables 
referring to either the employment relation, the employee in the employment relation or the workplace for 
the employment relation. Table 2 provides an overview of the variables used in this paper. The third 
column in the table below shows the highest number of levels used for categorical variables. 
Table 2: Variables 
Variable Level of measurement Levels 
Hourly wage Employment relation Continuous 
Occupation Employment relation 5 
Experience Employee Continuous 
Male Employee 2 
Education Employee 5 
CBA coverage Workplace 2 
Geographical position Workplace 2 
Size Workplace Continuous 
Industry Workplace 26 
 
The primary interest in the article deals with the relationship between the hourly wage in the employment 
relation and the CBA coverage of the workplace, while the rest of the variables are first and foremost to be 
regarded as control variables. 
Hourly wage is the total compensation in Danish Kroner converted to an hourly wage. More precisely, it 
includes the employee’s gross wage less any payments in connection with severance or first or second day 
of unemployment together with anniversary bonuses. The gross salary includes the wage itself and what 
there might be of other bonuses, vacation time, pension contributions, fringe benefits etc. 
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Occupation is based on the main groups in DISCO-087 and takes the five categories in the first column in 
Table 3. 
Table 3: Occupations 
Occupation DISCO-08 code DISCO-08 text 
Management 1 Managers 
Professionals and 
technicians 
2 Professionals 
3 Technicians and associate professionals 
Clerks, service, sales 
4 Clerical support workers 
5 Service and sales workers 
Craft 7 Craft and related trades workers 
Operator, transport, 
manual 
8 Plant and machine operators and assemblers 
9 Elementary occupations 
 
The employee’s experience is experience in their current job function measured in years. The employee’s 
education is the highest completed education according ISCED.
8
 Using this code, five categories are then 
constructed: Long, higher education (LHE) is defined as Master’s or Doctoral degree or equivalent. 
Intermediate higher education (IHE) is defined as bachelor’s degree or equivalent. Short higher education 
(SHE) is defined as short-cycle tertiary education. Vocational education programmes consist of the code for 
post-secondary non-tertiary education, while our fifth category, ‘none’, consists of all of the codes for 
secondary education and shorter education and training programmes. 
With respect to the geographical location of the workplace, distinction is only drawn between whether or 
not the workplace is in the capital region (not including Bornholm). The size of the workplace is measured 
on the basis of the number of employees in early November. 
The industry of the workplace is based on the Danish industry code 2007.
9
 The probability that an 
employment relation has CBA coverage and which factors have an impact on this probability vary little 
between the segments in the manufacturing industry, while the service industry is highly heterogeneous on 
these points. The service sectors are therefore divided in a more detailed manner than manufacturing. 
Overall, this means that our industry variable has 26 levels, as illustrated in Table 6 in the Appendix. Table 6 
also presents the number and percentages of employment relations without CBA coverage within each 
industry. These figures are also reported for each occupation within the division between industries that is 
used in the propensity score model for this particular occupation. The table reveals that the percentage of 
employment relations without CBA coverage varies from just a few percentages to over 40% and that the 
number of observations in each industry × occupation combination is more than sufficient to allow an 
analysis. 
                                                          
7
 The Danish version of ISCO-08; International Standard Classification of Occupations 2008. 
8
 International Standard Classification of Education. 
9
 DB07; the Danish version of the EU NACE 2 industry code (nomenclature statistique des activités économiques dans 
la Communauté européenne). 
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As already mentioned, the data set only contains private sector employees, although this includes a 
number of employment relations in the industry codes  84-88, public administration, health and education. 
This concerns employees in private emergency services, private business support organizations, private 
schools and private hospitals. 
5.  Results 
5.1. The probability of being covered by a CBA by gender, education, occupation, 
location and industry 
The results arrived at when using the propensity score matching method on our data set are presented in 
the following. The propensity score is an indication of the probability that an employment relation does not 
have CBA coverage. The first step is therefore to estimate this probability for all of the employment 
relations in the data set. Table 4 presents the result of a logistic regression in which the dependent variable 
is the probability for an employment relation not being covered by such an agreement. A negative estimate 
(and thus an odds-ratio of < 1) means that the factor has a negative effect on the probability to not have 
CBA coverage; that is, the factor has a positive effect on the probability for agreement coverage. 
Table 4: Logistic regression for the probability that an employment relation is not covered by a CBA  
Parameter   Estimate Std. Fejl Sign. 
Odds-
ratio 
Constant  -0.2369 0.0253 *** 0.7891 
Male  -0.1087 0.0090 *** 0.8970 
Ln(experience)  -0.0574 0.0029 *** 0.9443 
Ln(size)  -0.1930 0.0194 *** 0.8245 
Copenhagen   0.6669 0.0093 *** 1.9482 
Education None -0.1577 0.0175 *** 0.8541 
Education Vocational -0.2757 0.0172 *** 0.7591 
Education SHE Reference 
Education IHE -0.0276 0.0186 
 
0.9728 
Education LHE 0.1461 0.0188 *** 1.1573 
Occupation Managers 0.0464 0.0193 * 1.0474 
Occupation Professionals 0.1484 0.0118 *** 1.1600 
Occupation Sales Reference 
Occupation Crafts -0.5741 0.0257 *** 0.5632 
Occupation Manual -0.6912 0.0154 *** 0.5010 
Industry controls:  Included    
N 
 
908,324 
   Pseudo R2 (McFadden) 0.2511 
   Null deviance 
 
518,454 
   Residual deviance 388,284    
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.5; *p < 0.1 
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In Table 4, the odds of not having CBA coverage are a good 10% lower for men than for women (odds-ratio 
= 0.897). In other words, men have a slightly greater probability for agreement coverage when adjusting for 
the other factors in the model. A more dramatic effect is seen for Copenhagen, where the odds-ratio is 
1.9482. This means that the odds for not being covered by a CBA are almost twice as high in Copenhagen as 
in the rest of the country, albeit after adjusting for the other variables in the model; not least education, 
occupation and industry. Another area where relatively dramatic differences can be found is with the two 
occupations Crafts and Operator, transport and Manual, where the odds-ratio is 0.5632 and 0.5010, 
respectively, meaning that the odds for not having CBA coverage are almost half in both of these cases 
compared to the reference occupation: Clerks, Service and Sales. 
Both experience and size have negative estimates, meaning that the probability for not having CBA 
coverage decreases with the employee’s experience and the size of the workplace. 
The estimates in Table 4 generally present the expected results with the exception of the employees with 
short and intermediate higher education, who have the same probability for not having collective coverage. 
The next step in the analysis is to apply the estimates in Table 4 to estimate the probability for not having 
CBA coverage to the treatment group of 75,147 employment relations without coverage. A control group 
consisting of another 75,147 employment relations with collective coverage but where the distribution of 
the probability of not having CBA coverage is distributed exactly as in the former group, is the identified. 
5.2 The significance of CBA coverage for wage levels and wage dispersion – by 
occupation 
The estimated effects of a lack of CBA coverage on wages are presented in Table 5. All of the calculations 
are carried out for the natural logarithm for wages, but the table presents the data in Danish Kroner (DKK) 
for ease of interpretation. The average wage the treatment group is DKK 309.46/hour for the private labour 
market as a whole with a standard deviation of DKK 182.25. This is to be compared with the counterfactual 
wage for the “same” group, which is estimated by the average wage in the control group. The simplest 
approach is to use   (          )  as the counterfactual wage for observation  , where   is the 
employment relation in the control group that has been matched to employment relation   from the 
treatment group (Imbens and Wooldridge 2009). The counterfactual wage can therefore be estimated as 
the average wage in the control group. This brings us to the consequence of not having CBA coverage in the 
private labour market: on average, a 1% loss of hourly wages (i.e.            ). The variation between 
the two groups can also be compared showing that the wage variance is 1.17 times higher in the treatment 
group. Whether or not the effect of CBA coverage is 0 is tested using a t-test and whether the variance 
relationship is different from 1 is tested with an F-test.
10
  For the private labour market overall, both tests 
have a very low p-value, indicating that lacking CBA coverage reduces the average wage while increasing 
the wage dispersion. 
  
                                                          
10
 The t-test for whether       is different from 0 is actually a test of whether the two averages  ( ( )|   ) and 
 ( ( )|   ) are identical. The test was performed on the assumption of unequal variances and as a paired t-test. 
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Table 5: The effect of CBA coverage on wage levels and wage dispersion 
    All Manager 
Profs., 
techs. 
Clerks, 
service, 
sales Crafts 
Operator, 
transport, 
manual 
Wage Average, DKK 309.46 587.74 348.86 210.64 251.66 188.33 
without CBA Std.deviation, DKK 182.25 384.53 140.65 88.55 78.34 74.58 
Estimater Effect of "no CBA coverage" -1.0% 11.3% 0.2% -6.1% 2.3% -6.3% 
 
Variance ratio 1.17 1.05 1.08 1.07 0.99 1.10 
 
Regression-adjusted effect -1.4% 10.8% -0.1% -5.2% 1.8% -7.1% 
  (Std.error) 0.002 0.009 0.02 0.003 0.008 0.005 
Tests Effect of "no CBA" = 0, t-stat -4.304 11.375 0.692 -16.649 2.457 -10.306 
 
Effect of "no CBA" = 0, p-value <0.0001 <0.0001 0.4891 <0.0001 0.0141 <0.0001 
 
Variance ratio = 1, F-stat 1.169 1.052 1.084 1.071 0.985 1.099 
  Variance ratio = 1, p-value <0.0001 0.0773 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.7279 <0.001 
Data NB without CBA match 75.147 4.902 40.833 19.954 2.237 7.208 
  NB without CBA omitted 0 4 4 3 2 0 
 
Table 5 also reports a regression-adjusted effect of agreement coverage. In other words: this effect has 
been produced by an OLS regression with the natural logarithm for wage as the dependent variable and 
treatment together with all of the variables from the propensity score models as the explanatory variables. 
According to Stuart (2010), this makes it possible to adjust for remaining bias after matching as long as the 
imbalance in the data is not too great, as described previously. We especially have problems with the 
balance for the occupations, ‘Clerks, services, sales’ and ‘Operator, transport, manual’. In all of the cases, 
the regression-adjusted estimate is within two standard errors of the initially estimated effect, with the 
exception of ‘Offices, service, sales’, where the initially estimated effect is a 6.1% wage loss, while the 
regression-adjusted estimate is a 5.2% wage loss resulting from not having CBA coverage. Overall, the 
regression adjustment makes very little difference, which supports that the data have been matched 
satisfactorily. 
For all occupations with the exception of ‘Crafts’, the variance ratio is greater than 1, meaning that the 
wage dispersion is least when there is CBA coverage. The difference in the spread among those who are 
covered and those who are not among craftsmen is not statistically significant (cf. the F-test p-value). 
For two occupation categories, a wage benefit can be achieved by not having CBA coverage: ‘Managers’ 
have a 11.3% higher wage when not covered by an agreement, while the figure is 2.3% for ‘Crafts’ without 
agreement coverage. For two occupations there is a loss of wages resulting from not having CBA coverage: 
‘Clerks, sales, service’ lose 6.1% in wages while the figure is 6.3% for ‘Operator, transport, manual’. For the 
final occupation, ‘Professionals and technicians, there is no statistically significant effect of CBA coverage 
on wages. 
6. Discussion 
In many respects our results correspond to both the conclusions in the discussion of theory in section 2 and 
what we could expect when we couched the discussion in the Danish context with its particular bargaining 
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model and collective bargaining system. If we assume – like efficient bargaining theory and the 
institutionally oriented bargaining theories – imperfect competition on both the goods and factor market, 
there will be room for the unions’ struggle regarding the distribution of supernormal profits. The CBAs can 
therefore, ceteris paribus, result in a wage benefit for the agreement-covered employees in relation to 
those who are not covered by a CBA. Our study reveals a positive, albeit limited, wage benefit of 1% for the 
average of occupational groups. At the same time, the analysis shows that the CBAs reduce the overall 
wage spread for the CBA-covered labour market, a result which was also to be expected. 
A positive but modest wage benefit is to be expected inasmuch as few Danish wage earners are not 
covered by a CBA. It is reasonable to expect that the conditions from the organized labour market ‘rub off’ 
on the unorganized labour market if the unorganized companies without agreement coverage are to be 
able to recruit and retain qualified labour in competition with the organized, CBA-covered labour market. In 
that sense, the CBA-covered companies set the norms for wage formation, while the unorganized labour 
market is following and copying the standards for remuneration. 
There can, however, be another cause for the overall average wage benefit not being greater than 1%. The 
CBA-covered wage earners include both union members from the traditional ‘red’ unions and non-union 
members (free riders) together with members of the ‘yellow’ unions, which compete with the red unions to 
get more members.
11
 The numbers of unorganized wage earners and yellow union members have grown 
considerably since 1995, which might possibly have weakened the traditional, ‘red’ unions, which are at the 
table negotiating CBAs with the employees (Ibsen, Høgedahl and Scheuer 2012). American studies have 
shown that in companies where the number of free riders is limited, the trade unions’ wage benefit is 
greatest (and vice versa), as union bargaining power is influenced by the number of free riders (Budd and 
Na 2000; Schumacher 1999). In the Danish context, it is important to also include the number of yellow 
union members, which reinforces the negative effects on the bargaining power of the traditional unions. If 
this negative effect on bargaining power with respect to CBAs is to be documented, this study has to be 
supplemented with a study measuring the wage premium for those covered by a collective agreement over 
a period of time. 
Something that is relatively rare about this study is that it has also measured the size of the wage premium 
(positive and negative) for the occupations that our data set allows us to differentiate: managers; 
professional and technicians; clerks, service and sales; crafts; and operators, transport workers and manual 
labourers. For the group at the bottom of the wage hierarchy – operators/transport/manual labour and 
clerks/sales/service – there is a clear, positive wage benefit of a little more than 6% resulting from a CBA in 
relation to the same occupations carried out by those who have no CBA. Conversely, at the top of the 
corporate wage hierarchy there is a negative wage benefit of 11% resulting from being covered by an 
agreement. For ‘professional and technicians, there is no statistically significant benefit to be gained from 
CBA coverage, while there is a negative wage benefit of approximately 2% resulting from a CBA for skilled 
                                                          
11
 In the Danish context “Yellow Union” does not refer to a Company Union but to a private enterprise offering 
unemployment-, legal- and vocational training assistance to subscribers. Subscribing to a Yellow Union substitutes for 
membership of a Red Union in Danish labour market system, but unlike Red Unions these private enterprises do not 
participate in collective wage bargaining or participate in any other development towards common goals such as safety 
standers, working conditions etc. 
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craftsmen. These results were largely as expected. There is consensus among labour market economists 
that unions and CBAs, ceteris paribus, will be to the greatest advantage of the least educated and those 
with the lowest wages at the bottom of the wage hierarchy (Hirsch 2004a). In the Danish context, these 
low-wage groups will receive the same proportional wage increases as the groups with higher qualifications 
as a result of the periodic bargaining. This kind of solidarity wage policy prevails throughout the private 
sector and will therefore counteract the pressure exerted by market forces to remunerate occupational 
groups according to their qualifications and productivity. The impact of CBAs on wage formation is 
therefore to boost the bottom of the pay hierarchy and compress the wage structure in this segment of the 
labour market. It is worth noting, however, that the solidarity wage policy in the private sector has been 
supplemented in the collective bargaining in recent decades with a more individual wage policy linked to 
the qualifications of the individual (Ibsen 2014). 
Conversely, at the top of the pay hierarchy, the CBAs might possibly have a limiting effect on the 
opportunities available to some managers to obtain a pay-related return on their high qualifications if the 
managers’ CBA is covered by overall bargaining for all of the occupations as one; especially if there are 
egalitarian pay norms in the companies in question. In the parts of the labour market that are not covered 
by collective agreements, and which are marked by imperfect competition, the managers are able to 
appropriate a mark-up over the wage corresponding to their level of qualifications because of imperfect 
competition in the market for these qualifications. Our study shows how, on average, the managers who 
are covered by a CBA have received 11% less in pay compared to managers who are not covered by an 
agreement. It must be emphasized in this regard, however, that the number of CBAs for managers in the 
private sector is limited, for which reason the labour market for CBA-covered managers by no means sets 
the norm for wage-related manners in relation to the part of the labour market that is not covered by a 
CBA. 
More surprising yet is that our study indicates that the group ‘Craftsmen’ apparently loses some 2% on 
average as a result of CBA coverage. One would otherwise expect that the craftsmen who are covered by 
an agreement should be above those working without an agreement. The difference is limited (2%) and the 
explanation for the negative wage benefit might well be the (paradoxical) circumstance that it is the labour 
market for craftsmen that is covered by a CBA that sets the norms for wage levels for the labour market for 
those not covered by an agreement. Companies without a CBA must match the wage levels for craftsmen in 
the agreement-covered labour market – and in some cases compete to be able to recruit and retain their 
qualified workers. The same is the case with professional and technicians, where it is not possible to 
identify a benefit from CBA coverage; although here it must again be emphasized that, as with managers, 
the number of collective agreements for this group of academics in the private sector is limited. 
7. Summary and conclusion 
Internationally, broad consensus has prevailed among labour market economists that trade unions – 
primarily via their ability to enter into CBAs with their employer counterpart – produced a positive wage 
premium for the members in relation to the wage earners who are not union members. This assumption 
has been confirmed in theoretical studies about the subject and in a very large number of empirical 
investigations in a number of different countries, although each of these studies has pointed out 
methodological problems in their studies and they have produced diverging results when it comes to the 
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size of ’the union wage gap’. The same consensus has prevailed among Danish labour market economists, 
despite the absence of any empirical studies documenting this claim. 
The purpose of this study has been to investigate the impact of CBAs on wage levels and wage dispersion 
for employees in the private sector. We have compared the wage levels for employees who are covered by 
CBAs against the wage levels for employees who are not covered by an agreement, distinguishing between 
five different occupational groups in the private sector. 
The data material upon which the article builds is derived from a registry data from the Statistics Denmark 
pay structure statistics and a random sample ‘Other operating expenses’ (OOE), which are combined with 
company information provided by the Danish Employers’ Association (DA) and the Financial Sector 
Employers’ Association (FA). This data set covers the period 2002–2011, although this article only uses the 
data from 2011. OOE is a random sample-based statistic containing information about private employers’ 
expenses in connection with employment relations. These are the statistics from which the information 
pertaining to CBA coverage (or lack thereof) has been drawn. These materials have been supplemented 
with information from DA and FA. If it can be determined that the company is a member of either DA or FA, 
it is assumed that the company is also covered by a CBA. The data extraction covers pretty much the entire 
private sector with the exception of agriculture and fisheries but it only has information about companies 
with at least 10 full-time employees. The data set contains 911,154 employment relations. These 
employment relations can be described using a number of variables referring either to the employment 
relation, the employee in the employment relation or the workplace in which the employment relation 
takes place. The following variables were available: hourly wage, CBA coverage, occupation, experience, 
education, gender, industry, size and geographical location. The primary interest in this study is to 
investigate the relationship between the hourly wage in the employment relation and the workplace’s CBA 
coverage, while the remaining variables should first and foremost be regarded as control variables. 
Hourly wage is defined as the total compensation in Danish Kroner converted to a per-hour figure. More 
specifically, this covers the employees’ gross wage/salary less any payments in connection with severance 
or the first or second day of unemployment as well as anniversary bonuses. The gross pay includes the 
wage/salary itself together with possible supplements compensating for extraordinarily difficult working 
conditions and/or working hours together with vacation pay, bonuses for working statutory holidays, 
pension contributions fringe benefits etc. 
The statistical method used was accounted for in the method section, describing how we have measured 
the differences in wage levels and the wage distribution for employees who are covered by a CBA 
compared to the wage earners who are not covered by such an agreement. The international literature on 
the relationship between unions, wage levels and pay structure largely concentrates on the size of ‘the 
union membership wage premium’. As this study is unable to identify the employees’ trade union 
membership status, we have had to measure the impact of the unions on wage formation by focusing on 
the impact of CBAs on wage formation: the differences in wage levels and wage distribution for employees 
who are covered by CBAs and those who are not. As emphasized in section 2, this approach is relevant in 
the Danish context in terms of how the Danish organization and bargaining model are structured. 
Method-related problems can emerge if we solely focus on the differences in employee areas that are 
covered by CBAs or not. There might be differences between the wage earners who are covered by a 
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collective agreement or not – a bias that possibly affects the size of the wage gap. In order to account for 
this selection bias, we have used a statistical matching method, Propensity Score Matching, which accounts 
for a selection bias by pre-processing data prior to the analysis such that wages for employees without CBA 
coverage and those who are covered by an agreement can be compared. We are thus attempting to isolate 
the impact of CBA coverage on wage levels and wage distribution from the effect of these employees’ 
personal characteristics and workplace and job characteristics. In our data, CBA coverage is measured at 
the workplace level (cf. section 4), and when we refer to the effect of CBA coverage, we are therefore 
talking about the effect of being employed at a workplace where most of the employment relations are 
covered by a CBA. 
Collective agreement coverage is measured at the workplace level, whereas wages are measured via data 
for the employee at the individual employment relation level. The question then becomes what pay a given 
employee at a CBA-covered workplace would have received if their workplace had not had agreement 
coverage. As 92% of the employment relations in our data stem from workplaces that are covered by such 
agreements, it is more sound to estimate the effect on the remaining 8% of not having CBA coverage. For 
these 8%, it is possible to find a corresponding number of similar employment relations among the 92% of 
those who are covered by a CBA such that the counterfactual wage can be calculated.  
The results of the study indicate that, overall, the CBAs provide a positive, albeit limited, wage premium to 
those who are covered by them as a whole. The limited extent of this premium must be seen in the light of 
how collective agreement coverage in the Danish labour market is very high and that the companies that 
are covered by such agreements set the norms for wage formation for the entire labour market. Companies 
without CBAs are forced to follow the wage formation on the agreement-covered labour market in order to 
recruit and retain their labour.  
Another key finding is how CBAs lead to less wage dispersion for those covered by collective agreements in 
relation to the section of the labour market that is not covered by such agreements. The bottom of the 
wage hierarchy receives a boost, as the CBAs primarily benefit those with the least education and those 
with lower wages together with the group of skilled office, sales and service workers, where it is possible to 
trace a positive and relatively large wage premium. These results are to be expected and match the studies 
carried out in other countries. 
At the same time, we can see that the CBAs for managers produce a considerable, negative wage premium, 
while skilled craftsmen are paid more or less equally on the segments of the labour market covered by 
CBAs and those that are not, the latter having a slight advantage. In the labour market for highly qualified 
professionals and technicians, it is not possible to identify a positive wage premium, and the overall result 
of the study is therefore that the trade unions’ collective agreement work is to the greatest benefit of the 
occupations with the lowest wages; a result that we expected and which is supported by other theoretical 
and empirical studies. 
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Appendix (tables not translated from Danish): 
Table 6: Industry division and number and % employed w/o CBA coverage 
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Table 7: Balance after matching 
 
